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”Gordon Tullock: Rational Maverick” [Posted: Nov. 7, 2017]  
 
It must be nearly impossible to read much by Gordon Tullock without 
coming away with—among many other things—the impression that 
he must have had one of the most creative and fruitful minds among 
modern social scientists. As Boettke rightly notes: ”Tullock was a 
polymath.” How many others could cover medieval Ottoman 
execution methods, mathematical analysis of voting, the history of 
Chinese diplomacy, the sex lives of insects, and modern social 
policies? 
But Tullock was more than knowledgeable. Just peruse the 
chapters of The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock 1962/2004) 
that he is known to have authored, or The Social Dilemma (Tullock 
1974), or Autocracy (Tullock 1987), or almost any of his many journal 
articles, especially from the 1950s to the 1980s, and you will find one 
example after another of brilliant little, although not-quite-fully-
developed, insights in one paragraph after another. Thoughts, 
suggestions, and conjectures that almost never were never fully 
elaborated, much less tested systematically, but could have been, are 
just lying there to be picked up.  
For some years I kept my own list of things ”to be explored” that I 
stumbled over in Tullock’s writings. In fact, the very first 
                                           
* The three comments were part of an on-line “conversation” in Liberty Fund’s 
“Liberty Matters” series (http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/lm-tullock), November 
2017. 
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international journal article I ever published grew out of just such a 
throw-away paragraph in Autocracy (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000). My 
own interest in the potential disequilibrium of voting in 
multidimensional spaces came from Tullock’s early, brief, and 
intuitive treatment (Tullock 1967) rather than the heavily technical 
proofs others had produced over the following decade. 
Tullock was, as Buchanan called him, a ”natural economist” 
(Buchanan 1987) in the sense that ”the economic way of thinking” 
came so naturally to him that he could not help constantly taking it 
to new areas of application. He was always looking for another place 
to apply methodological individualism, the rational-actor principle, 
and the focus on exchange: yet another puzzle to be solved, another 
piece of knowledge to be passed on. In contrast, Tullock had very 
little interest in yet another minor technical contribution with little 
relevance to real-world issues.  
So, I agree with Boettke’s summary of Tullock’s importance and 
that he had deserved a Nobel Prize: 
 
“This was a prize that eluded him, and in my opinion he deserved his own 
prize for this various contributions to the study of human action beyond the 
realm of. the market, that is, nonmarket decision-making – in law, politics, 
science, bureaucracies, nonprofits, and nature. Tullock was a trailblazer; he 
was always stalking taboo subjects and pushing out our intellectual 
boundaries.” 
 
But if Tullock was such a brilliant, inquisitive mind, why did he not 
receive the praise and rewards many of us think he should have 
received? There are probably more reasons than one—but in my 
opinion none of them should have denied him the honors that eluded 
him. 
Was it that Tullock was not as ”grand” a thinker as some other 
economists? Looking at the relatively narrow contributions of some 
other Nobel laureates, I think this would be a hard point to argue as 
a stand-alone reason. Tullock’s contributions to our understanding of 
voting, rent-seeking, and log-rolling, and his broad application of the 
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rational-choice paradigm to human behavior, collective action, and 
our understanding of the law, easily outweigh the contributions of 
many Nobel laureates. 
But I do think a problem was that Tullock so often—and almost 
always beginning in the mid-1970s or so—left his gold nuggets lying 
around, not quite polished. He threw 100 ideas up in the air and went 
on, where many others would have taken 10 of them and developed 
them further, endlessly applying and extending the insights and 
building ”schools” around them and themselves. 
Many others who have grappled with the question of why Tullock 
did not receive the honors he perhaps deserved have focused on his 
personality, namely, that he sometimes came across as impolite or 
even offensive. 
Strangely, I never interpreted him that way—and I still remember 
the shock with which a world-famous Ivy League economist greeted 
my view that I found Tullock to be ”nice”: ”I have never heard anyone 
refer to Gordon as being ‘nice.’” Well, I think he was. Yes, he was odd, 
and yes, he could say things that some either would disagree with 
vehemently or would be taken aback by because of his often-
provocative and direct tone and style. But in my many encounters 
with Tullock—from the first time I met him as a first-year 
undergraduate at a conference in 1986 to the last time I saw him, a 
year or so before his retirement—I always found him to be generous, 
hospitable, and helpful. 
Yes, he could say things that some would find impolite or harsh. 
The first time I saw him after having sent him my doctoral 
dissertation, he said something like, ”You could have spent your time 
and money more wisely. You used 400 pages to say what you could 
have said in four words: ‘Tullock is always right!’” I thought it was a 
funny remark—with a kernel of truth in it. 
Yes, he could also seem socially handicapped. The combination of 
his ever-present intellectual focus, his very low voice, and his 
impaired hearing made dinner or lunch conversations a bit difficult 
sometimes, to say the least. But compared to at least a handful of 
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Nobel laureates in economics, Tullock did not come off as particularly 
odd. 
Was it his politics? Again, it has been said by more than one 
economist—including people who actually like and practice public 
choice analysis—that Tullock had ”reactionary” or ”right-wing” 
views that made him out of step with the Zeitgeist. 
It is true that he often would argue in favor of deeply unpopular 
points of view. (”There isn’t anything particularly good about 
democracy, aside from being democratic.”) He also seemed to enjoy 
some degree of being ”politically incorrect.” But I am not so sure that 
Tullock was really as much an ideologue as many others believed. I 
remember the 1994 meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society in Cannes, 
when I was standing in the foyer talking with Tullock and Charles 
Rowley. A young French economics student, whom I knew to be a 
huge fan of Tullock, approached star-struck and said in a heavy 
accent, ”Professor Tullock! I am such a great admirer! I have always 
wanted to ask you about libertarianism.” Tullock cut him off, saying, 
”I am not particularly interested in liberty,” and walked away, 
leaving the poor fellow with his jaw on the floor.  
Was it rude? An impartial spectator would likely see it as such. I 
think Tullock—always the homo economicus—was merely trying to 
save time for both of them. If anything, Tullock was probably a 
relatively pragmatic consequentialist of some sort--not necessarily a 
hard-core utilitarian, but broadly interested in what arrangements 
would tend to produce the best outcomes. Sometimes it would lead 
his policy conclusions in one direction—other times in another. He 
was not much of an ideologue, and ultimately everything was up for 
discussion. 
And what about the other explanations that have been thrown 
around? -- for example, that Tullock was not an economist by formal 
training. Well, neither was Herbert Simon and Elinor Ostrom. Or that 
he was not very technical in an age when mathematical prowess was 
and is so much in vogue. Again, the same can be said about Ostrom, 
James Buchanan, F. A. Hayek, and Douglass North. 
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I think that the ”real” reason was the sum total of it all. Tullock 
might have received his Nobel Prize despite being personally odd or 
being placed on the political right or not being trained as an 
economist or not publishing highly mathematical models. But all of 
this together, combined with the fact that he often went on to new 
ideas and applications rather than building empires around himself, 
probably made it highly unlikely. 
Fortunately for the rest of us, there are still so many insightful 
nuggets from Tullock lying around, ready to be picked up--perhaps 
more than many think. I find Boettke’s points regarding Tullock’s 
approach being more ”praxeological” and less neoclassical than often 
portrayed particularly important. Anti-rational-choice academics 
often portray Tullock as the archetypical ”economic imperialist”—a 
view he often attributed to himself. (Tullock 2006 [1976]) But in 
reality, his approach was much more nuanced and multifaceted than 
many have appreciated. 
 
 
”Tullock: Praxeologist or Economic Imperialist?” [Posted: 
November 30, 2017]  
 
Prof. Boettke initially brought up the issue that Gordon Tullock really 
should be seen as closer to the Austrian school than is commonly 
acknowledged—a point already pursued here by Prof. Levy 
regarding how Tullock had been influenced by Mises’s Human Action. 
(Mises 1949/1966) 
Now we seem to be facing two interpretations that easily could 
seem at odds.  On the one hand, there are the indications suggested 
by Boettke and Levy that Tullock had more of an ”open-ended” 
(broad) rationality assumption, closer to the human-action 
perspective of the Austrian school than is usually acknowledged. 
On the other hand, Tullock has usually been seen as almost the 
intellectual embodiment of homo economicus—the economic 
imperialist par excellence.  He embraced the label of ”economic 
imperialism” himself (e.g., Tullock 1972/2004), and a collection of 
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some of his (rejected) papers was entitled On the Trail of Homo 
Economicus. (Tullock 1994)  This was also how close friends and 
collaborators saw him, e.g., Buchanan in his description of Tullock as 
a ”natural economist” (Buchanan 1987)—a perspective Buchanan 
distanced himself from. 
So which picture of Tullock is right?  Boettke (and Levy) suggest 
the former, Buchanan the latter.  How about Tullock himself? Let me 
say that I think that both sides are right but that Tullock possibly 
created confusion about his own ”approach.” 
What we perhaps should keep in mind is the distinction Buchanan 
made to highlight the differences between himself and scholars like 
Tullock (Buchanan 1979: 41-51, 57ff): between the (”high”) abstract 
levels of the ”pure logic of choice” and the (low) concrete levels of 
specific models with narrower assumptions, e.g., those associated 
with what Buchanan called ”the abstract theory of economic 
behavior.”  This is to a large extent the distinction between Misesian 
praxeology and day-to-day economic analysis, as in, e.g., applications 
of the theory of the firm.  Or as Buchanan suggested: it is the 
distinction between a game-theoretical model with only preference 
orderings given and one where objective payoffs are used.  With the 
former, the structure of the preferences alone may tell us something 
important but quite general about human action—but it cannot tell 
us very much about any specific situation.  In contrast, as soon as we 
limit what may enter the utility function and the size of specific 
payoffs, we can be more precise in our predictions—but with the cost 
being at a lesser level of generality.  (Some may here see a similarity 
to ”Austrian” discussions of the use of ideal types, e.g., Kurrild-
Klitgaard 2001.) 
Seen in this perspective, one could say, as Buchanan suggested, 
that his analyses mostly operated at the ”higher” levels, while Tullock 
mostly did so at the ”lower” levels.  But the two levels are not 
necessarily opposed—they are simply different and may be relevant 
for different kinds of analysis.  In The Calculus of Consent, where 
Tullock himself used the term ”praxiological” (sic), he too, like 
Buchanan, was interested in a more abstract type of analysis than 
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when he was analyzing, say, U.S. social policies (Tullock 1986), 
military tactics (Brennan and Tullock 1982), or survival strategies of 
medieval monarchs (Tullock 2001).  Tullock, simply put, operated 
along all the steps of the ladder of abstraction—but usually without 
spending much time on philosophy of science and methodology, 
preferring instead the narrower, more empirical applications.   
And permit me here to return to the issue of Tullock’s personality: 
teasing, politically incorrect, and actively seeking out intellectual 
opposition, features that no doubt led him to make oral (re-
)statements of his thought more ”outrageous” than they really 
were.  Many people have, for example, heard Tullock quip that his 
favourite piece of literature was Dickens’s A Christmas Carol—except, 
Tullock said, ”for the unhappy ending when Scrooge goes soft.” This, 
of course, was a joke, but what did Tullock mean when he widely 
claimed, as Boettke mentions, that people are 95 percent narrowly 
self-interested?  Of course, he did not mean that it always and 
everywhere was exactly 95 percent, as if it was a natural law.  He 
meant it at the ”low” level as an empirical generalization, and a 
falsifiable one, most importantly--and one admitting, implicitly, that 
people are not exclusively narrowly self-interested. 
Does it matter?  It does to some extent.  The Virginia school is 
usually distanced—sometimes by its adherents, most often by its 
opponents—from two of its ”cousins”: The Bloomington school of the 
Ostroms and the Rochester school of Riker. (Mitchell 1988)  The 
Bloomington institutionalists are often seen as more interested in the 
softer institutions and informal norms. (Aligica and Boettke 
2009)  And the game theorists of the Rochester school have for 
decades allowed utility functions of actors to consist of virtually 
anything and sometimes as quite abstract and open-ended. (Riker 
and Ordeshook 1973)  These are genuine differences when compared 
to Tullock’s rhetoric and predominant practice. But when Buchanan’s 
distinction is kept in mind, they are not polar opposites as much as 
different points along a continuum.  
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”Tullock on Liberty” [Posted: November 30, 2017]  
 
I want to bring up a point that few have touched directly upon in this 
conversation, namely, Tullock’s ideological position.  After all, this is 
”Liberty Matters” run by Liberty Fund.  So what were Tullock’s views 
on liberty?   
As I mentioned in my first comment, Tullock seems—from 
anecdotal experience—not to have seen himself as a libertarian. In 
fact, when you browse Tullock’s works, there is a marked lack of 
references to liberty.  The word appears six times in The Calculus of 
Consent—all six in the titles of cited works.  However, the cited works 
are not important in this respect: they were Berlin’s Two Concepts of 
Liberty (1958/1969) and Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty (1960)—
which in itself says a great deal.  Similarly with ”freedom,” to which 
there are a total of 15 references, but again mostly titles, including 
Leoni’s Freedom and the Law (1961/1991).  In other prominent works 
by Tullock (e.g., 1974, 1986, and 1987), there is even less emphasis on 
liberty/freedom. 
That, of course, did not mean that Tullock was uninterested in how 
free humans are, but rather that he, first and foremost, was a 
consequentialist of some form.  Certainly, when you read him 
straight from his earliest works, there seems often—as with many 
economists—to be much of a utilitarian reasoning at play and a 
decidedly non-”moral” attitude. 
But Tullock rarely made normative recommendations based in 
crude comparisons of supposed utilities across individuals. 
Sometimes, but not often.  Most of the time Tullock seems to have 
approached what perhaps more resembles a form of ”rule 
utilitarianism.”  He was interested in what arrangements in general 
would tend to have the highest net value, broadly understood, to 
society. 
This is probably where Tullock shared a path with Buchanan and 
at the same time diverged.  They shared a view of market exchange 
as being socially beneficial and a fear of what would happen if law 
and order broke down. (Buchanan 1977/2001, Tullock 1972/2004)  But 
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where Buchanan was interested in the potential for cooperation, 
Tullock was fascinated by the lack of it. 
So, if we compare their respective writings, we see—somewhat 
simplified—a tale of two theories of what happens when human 
beings have divergent interests: the one somewhat idealistic and 
rationalist (Buchanan), showing how the same forces that work in the 
marketplace (contract and exchange) may lead  them to adopt 
institutional frameworks that will work for the common good 
(Buchanan 1975/1999), the other empiricist, skeptical, and cynical 
(Tullock), seeing potential conflict (war, plunder, rent-seeking, etc.) 
everywhere (Tullock 1974)--the former seeing men as naturally equal, 
the latter seeing them as naturally ending up in different places of 
power and hierarchy. 
This is, so to speak, a modern conflict between a Tom Paine, or at 
least a Thomas Jefferson, and an Edmund Burke (although Tullock, 
of course, would have had none of Burke’s romanticism). 
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